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Weproposeamethodutilizingaderivedsocialsecuritynumberwiththesamereliabilityasthesocialsecuritynumber.Weshowthe
anonymity techniques classically based on unidirectional hash functions (such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA-2) function that
can guarantee the security, quality, and reliability of information if these techniques are applied to the Social Security Number).
Hashing produces a strictly anonymous code that is always the same for a given individual, and thus enables patient data to be
linked. Diﬀerent solutions are developed and proposed in this article. Hashing the social security number will make it possible
to link the information in the personal medical ﬁle to other national health information sources with the aim of completing or
validating the personal medical record or conducting epidemiological and clinical research. This data linkage would meet the
anonymous data requirements of the European directive on data protection.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the majority of industrialized countries, patient identiﬁ-
cation lies at the heart of many of the concerns relating to
electronic processing of health information. In August 2004,
the French government decided by law to start a national
project for an electronic health record called the “dossier
m´ edical personnel,” the personal medical record (PMR) [1].
It is designed to promote health care coordination, enhance
communication of health information, and reduce iatro-
genic accidents. The information system corresponding to
this project is still under construction. Regarding the patient
identiﬁer, one of the proposals has been to use the existing
social security number (SSN).
However, civil society and bodies representing citizens
(patients’ associations, those defending individual liberties,
national councils of medical associations) are worried, quite
rightly, about the security of medical information [2] should
the SSN be used as an identiﬁer in the ﬁeld of health. They
are afraid that medical information may be linked with other
information (social, economic, ﬁnancial, employment) of-
ten identiﬁed by the SSN. This is one of the reasons why
the government decided to postpone this project (Novem-
ber 2007) [3]. Nevertheless, in December 2007, a work-
ing group was mandated by the government to propose,
as soon as possible, a solution for the HIN, which will be
used not only for the DMP project but also for health in
general.
Through this paper, we ﬁrst propose a method which
aims both to reassure citizens’ representatives regarding the
security of medical information and to give the opportunity
to the French government to utilize a derived SSN with the2 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
same reliability as the SSN. A solution based on the utiliza-
tion of anonymity techniques is proposed.
Secondly, we analyse the conditions necessary to make
this ﬁrst solution interoperable at the European level.
2. BACKGROUND
In an increasing number of countries, patients have direct
access to their medical records (MR), and some countries in-
cluding France [1] have decided to provide a personal med-
ical record (PMR) to the patient. We deﬁne MR [4]a sp a -
tients’ medical information recorded by the medical practi-
tioner under his or her own responsibility and ideally elec-
tronically signed by him/her in order to authenticate the
provider (health professional) and to prevent any modiﬁca-
tion of its content.
In contrast, the PMR is personally supervised by each
patient, who has the right to mask any information he/she
does not want to be read. As the owner of this PMR, the pa-
tient determines who can gain access to his/her record. Of
course, patients are very worried that information concern-
ing their private lives may be disclosed. Such concerns are in-
creasing as more sensitive medical details, such as psychiatric
records, HIV status, and genetic information, are stored in
their PMRs. In France, to enhance the coordination of care,
the PMR’s data will be stored in national shelters. So patients
need to be sure that medical information may not be linked
with other information (social, economic, ﬁnancial, employ-
ment) also identiﬁed by the SSN, if the SSN was used as an
identiﬁer for the PMR.
Many other countries have chosen a homogenous na-
tional patient identiﬁcation system (e.g., Northern Euro-
pean countries such as Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Ireland)
[5], and the former countries in this list are even using the
same identiﬁcation number for other ﬁelds than health care.
Apart from Belgium, the above-mentioned countries imple-
mented a unique patient identiﬁer some time ago, and the
citizens are used to it and to the creation of national health
databases. However, in the United Kingdom, patients are re-
assured because there is no national shelterer and medical
records are stored by the general practitioner who cannot
transmitorreceiveanyinformationregardingapatientwith-
out his/her consent.
In Southern European countries identiﬁcation is often
organized at a regional level (Spain and Italy) and patients
are more familiar with the creation of large health databases
organized at a federal level as in other countries (Canada and
the USA).
To reassure French patients regarding the security of
their medical data which will be stored at a national level,
we propose in this paper the creation of a secure patient
identiﬁer which should be diﬀerent from the SSN to avoid
linkage with other data, but which should be as reliable
as the SSN. This proposed solution could be used by any
country needs to implement a unique health identiﬁcation
number.
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1. Asolutiontothesecurityproblems
As we said before, it is perfectly possible to preserve the
conﬁdentiality expected by the patient by putting in place
anonymity procedures [6, 7] such as those adopted by the
Institut de Veille Sanitaire (the French Institute for Pub-
lic Health Surveillance) [8] on the recommendation of the
French National Commission for Data protection, in the
context of followup procedures for the 30 diseases subject to
mandatory reporting (including AIDS).
Unlike encryption methods that must be reversible to al-
low the legitimate recipient to decode the message, unidi-
rectional hashing techniques, such as the standard hash al-
gorithm in its modiﬁed version SHA-2 (SHA-2 is consid-
ered “signiﬁcantly stronger” than SHA-1, although some-
what slower: NSA and NATO recommend it in the SUITE-
B package (ECC, AES and SHA-2.)), are irreversible. Hash-
ing produces a strictly anonymous code (it is not possible
to retrace the patient identity) that is always the same for
a given individual and thus ensures that patient data can
be linked. There are many medical applications including
the creation of national databases (such as those relating to
the national followup of infected persons—approximately
100000 patients—which are an excellent example of how it
can help epidemiological research [9], with complete patient
approval [10]) as well as regional and interregional databases
in many areas (cancer, perinatal diseases, genetic diseases).
This system, which is based on the hash coding of the so-
cial security number [11], the gender and the date of birth,
has also made it possible to link all standardized hospital
discharge abstracts, classiﬁed into French diagnosis-related
groups at the French national level, and to link the data
of the national medical insurance information system. An
anonymity procedure based on hash coding is also used to
chain patient ﬁles in Switzerland [12]. Similar solutions [13],
also derived from the irreversible encryption of the unique
social security number, have been proposed in Belgium [14]
and New Zealand.
In the case of the PMR, the situation is no more complex
because similar requirements must be met.
(i) The French Commission for data protection, and as-
sociations of patients and healthcare professionals de-
mand the conﬁdentiality of personal information con-
tained in the PMR.
(ii) Public health bodies or individuals need to have access
to these data, particularly when the patient has given
express consent.
Ideally, hashing the social security number would help to
meet these requirements. Regarding conﬁdentiality, insofar
as the social security number (SSN) could not be reconsti-
tuted using the health identiﬁer number (HIN), the link be-
tween them would be broken. Another advantage of using
hash coding is that it meets the criterion of being focused
(created and maintained solely as a support for health care).
This is one of the main criteria of a universal health care















HIN: Health identiﬁcation number
Figure 1: Schema of the proposed solution.
Testing and Materials, a standards development organization
accredited by the American National Standards Institute, in
the standard guide for properties of a universal healthcare
identiﬁer [15].
This solution satisﬁes the demands of French Commis-
sion for data protection in that the SSN would be rendered
anonymous by a trustworthy third party and would thus
permit the generation of a health identiﬁer number (HIN)
known by the patient. This supposes that the HIN would be
included in the patient smart card, used for administrative
and ﬁnancial purposes (reimbursement of medical care).
For French patients associations, the interest and impor-
tance of printing the health identiﬁer number (HIN) on the
patient smart card lie in the fact that it would mobilize and
sensitize patients, and increase their awareness that the iden-
tiﬁer is diﬀerent from the SSN. In fact, if the SSN was ren-
dered anonymous using a hash algorithm, there would be
no link between the new number and the personal details of
the individual, which is not the case for the SSN. Neverthe-
less, it seems to us that this solution is an illusion in terms of
security and reliability because the correspondence between
the SSN and HIN would be set out on the patient smart
card and would therefore also be known by the health work-
force:theSSNis needed inthe smartcardforreimbursement
purposes.
Withregardtomethodology,toprovideanonymitysafely
requires double hashing, because anonymity is not guaran-
teedbyasinglehashingprocess[6,7];twohashingkeysmust
be used to obtain complete anonymity. As a consequence,
this solution must be completed by the following principles.
According to Figure 1, the health professional can provide to
the portal of the application a coding HIN obtained through
reversible encryption. The HIN hashing transformation is
carried out by the portal. The HIN will itself be transformed
into a stocking HIN in the same way that the SSN was trans-
f o r m e di n t oa nH I N ,b u tw i t had i ﬀerent key (see Figure 1).
Thisportalcanthentransmitthiscodetothedata-processing
shelterer safely and reliably.
If a person manages to get the SSN of a patient and uses
the hash function, he has to know the key used by the trust-
worthy third party to obtain the HIN of the patient. This is
very diﬃcult. However, as the SSN and the HIN of the pa-
tient will both be included in the smart card of the patient
and used by health professionals, there is a risk of a breach of
privacy in health structures. That is why we propose to ap-
ply a double-hash procedure. The aim of hash coding of the
HIN by the Portal (with a more diﬀerent key than that used
for hash coding the SSN) is to obtain an anonymised identi-
ﬁer (stocking HIN) before sending it to the data processing
shelter.
It also seems fundamental to us that prerequired con-
ditions be imposed in terms of security and conﬁdentiality
[18] regarding access to medical data in health structures.
This raises several concerns, the ﬁrst of which is related to
the authentication of health-care professionals. The solution
would be a smart card attributed to professionals in both
the private sector and public hospitals. In France, the use of
such cards was imposed in May 2007. Our second concern
is the archiving of health data by health professionals. It is
not only about controlling the right of access to diﬀerent ap-
plications, but also about ensuring the security of local hard
disk storage, preventing direct access to the databases, and
guaranteeingthesecurityofexternalarchives(BandandCD-
ROM). Lastly, we are also very concerned about the security
of exchanges among health professionals. We must point out
that many health-care professionals require access to medical
records from home, for example, or when on call. A similar
situation arises when records are forwarded to doctors dur-
ing vacations through the internet. We also know that some
data processing specialists or computer science experts need
access to health structure data for application maintenance.
We then strongly recommend the use of networks like virtual
private network, in addition to the professional authentica-
tion card, as a solution to the problem of the security of data
exchange.
3.2. Conditionsformakingthissolutioninteroperable
Mobility must not compromise healthcare for European
nationals. Residents of one member state travelling to or
working in another member state should have the same
right to high-quality healthcare as all other Europeans (see,
e.g., Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). It is thus very impor-
tant to ensure interoperability between the patients identi-
ﬁers in the diﬀerent European countries. However, in Eu-
rope, each country has its own patient identiﬁer with very
diﬀerent structures and contents, and which may not al-
ways be derived from an SSN. As a consequence, the use
of the SSN alone (or a derived SSN) to generate the HIN
in European countries would not solve the interoperability
problem.
One solution would be to add personal patient char-
acteristics such as family name, ﬁrst name, date of birth
(separately hashed) to be able to link data even in the case of
ﬁelderrorsorotherlocalerrorstotheSSN,whichwouldhelp
to comply with the recommendations of the International4 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
Association of Medical Information Technology, and where
possibletoensureinteroperabilityofthisidentiﬁerwithaEu-
ropean identiﬁer [16].
We propose to add to the European health card, as well as
the national social insurance number of the patients in each
country, a family-based identiﬁer which could contribute
to the harmonisation of patients’ identiﬁcation at the Eu-
ropean level. This solution would lead to the creation of a
European health identiﬁer which would allow patient data
to be gathered anywhere in Europe, whatever their location,
even if their social insurance number changes according to
their country of residence. This will be useful, at the individ-
ual level, to provide higher quality health care due to a better
followup of the patient and to facilitate the reimbursement
of health care costs. At the community level, this will in-
crease the reliability of public health statistics. The great ad-
vantage of this European health identiﬁer based on the fam-
ily component is that it is built from very basic information,
which is available to everybody, easily checkable and perma-
nent throughout the patient life. This is not the case for the
social insurance number. Our proposal to use the family-
based identiﬁer to create a unique European identiﬁer will
make it possible to link the data of a patient even when he
or she resides outside his or her home country in Europe. It
will also contribute to the establishment of European public
health statistics by matching healthcare data of the patients
records with other administrative data (mortality, social in-
formation, etc.) after anonymisation of these data in accor-
dance with the European directive on data protection.
We could also propose to use biometric technologies
(and then apply hash coding to ensure anonymity). Biomet-
rictechnologiesaresometimesproposedasawaytoassociate
a patient with his or her medical data, as they do not require
the patient to bring any documents or remember any in-
formation. Though this technology represents real progress
both in the identiﬁcation and in the authentication of the
patient, there are still many questions [17] regarding the ac-
curacy and reliability of each biometric technology and the
associated costs. But the main problem lies in the acceptabil-
ity of such systems by organisations concerned with ethical
considerations such as patients’ associations, national ethics
committees, human rights associations, and national com-
mittees for data protection. For example, in France, the use
of biometric solutions for identiﬁcation in the ﬁeld of health
has not been approved by the National Ethics Committee.
4. DISCUSSION
Initially, the government planned to use the SSN as an HIN,
as health professionals already know the SSN for health re-
imbursement reasons. Patients’ associations, those defend-
ing individual liberties, national councils of medical associa-
tions,haveaskedforanidentitynumberHINthatisdiﬀerent
from the SSN, their requirements are the following.
(i) First, that patients are made aware that the HIN used
for medical care is not the same as the SSN.
(ii) Second, that there are two diﬀerent databases for
health professionals (located in hospitals or in other
structures): a database for health reimbursements
which will exclusively use the SSN for administrative
reasons, and another medical care database for med-
ical purposes which will not use the SSN because of
its private aspect, but an anonymous identity number
HIN diﬀerent from the SSN.
We had to comply with these requirements and are thus
obliged to provide tables to show the link between the SSN
and the HIN for all patients in all health structures for ad-
ministrative purposes, which can be considered as the most
important disadvantage of the proposed solution.
Patients’ associations and national councils of medical
associations have been aware of the need for a correspon-
dence table between administrative databases (for health re-
imbursements) and personal databases (for medical pur-
poses). This correspondence table was not a real problem
for them as such tables currently exist in hospitals because
of the need to link medical personal data (hospital discharge
abstracts referenced by the ﬁrst and second name, date of
birth, etc.) with billing data referenced by the SSN. This
particularly arises from the fact that administrators need to
have access to medical information in order to determine the
levels of hospital activity and justify hospital budgets. The
solution for the existing correspondence table between ad-
ministrative databases (for health reimbursements) and per-
sonal databases (for medical purposes) was to put it under
the responsibility of the medical information department.
That is why the associations concerned consider that using
an HIN obtained through irreversible transformation of the
SSN provides more security than the current situation where
themedicaldataarestoredwithpersonalcharacteristics(ﬁrst
a n ds e c o n dn a m e ,d a t eo fb i r t h ,e t c . ) .
We consider that our proposal must be accompanied by
thereinforcementofmeasuresregardingthesecurityofmed-
ical information inside hospitals, as proposed at the end of
the Section 3. In particular, we focused on the need to code
(reversible encryption) both the HIN and SSN in hospitals
when they are related to health-care databases.
As a consequence, the main concern regarding the per-
sonal medical record (PMR) and centralised storage of pa-
tient medical information is the security of data, not only
at the level of the health structures, but also at the data-
processing shelterer. Knowing that a correspondence table
between the SSN and the ﬁrst HIN would exist in health
structures,weproposetransformingtheﬁrstHINintoastor-
ing HIN by using an irreversible encryption method to se-
curestorage(data-processingshelterer).Asonlythemanager
oftheportalwillknowthekeyofthissecondhashing,nodic-
tionary attacks can be used to try to obtain the ﬁrst HIN, and
thus the corresponding SSN through the correspondence ta-
ble (if hashed at the health structure level).
Concerning the proposed solution to security prob-
lems, this method has several advantages. First, in terms
of organisation, it avoids implementation of the hashing
function at the level of the health professional. Second,
it also avoids supplementary costs, implementation delays,
and the disclosure of the technical hashing system to other
actors.Catherine Quantin et al. 5
The second advantage is that it provides the possibility
to use diﬀerent hash-coding keys to generate a diﬀerent HIN
for each major application such as the PMR, regional, and/or
national applications such as health care networks, health
administration, diagnosis and healthcare, and epidemiolog-
ical research without delivering the corresponding applica-
tion keys to all of the health professionals. Moreover, hashing
responsibility and key management can be delegated to each
application.
If the concept of speciﬁc HINs for diﬀerent applications
is accepted, it will be necessary to create a structuresimilar to
the Data Matching Agency created in Australia to manage all
of the identiﬁers. This agency could be in charge of matching
with regard to legal, deontological, organisational, and tech-
nical aspects, since the trustworthiness of such an agency is
based on a complex combination of legal obligations (in or-
der to provide justiﬁable legal reliability) and organisational-
and-technical security measures (in order to provide justiﬁ-
able robustness with regard to accuracy of data).
Management of HINs consists in not only ensuring the
linkage of the diﬀerent databases, but also guaranteeing the
security of the diﬀerent identiﬁers. For example, the real
risks raised by using the same identiﬁer in regional and na-
tional applications have to be considered: it is important to




tients protected, the agency would liaise with national com-
missions for data protection.
5. CONCLUSION
Our proposal for a French health identiﬁcation number
would make it possible to uniquely identify and link a pa-
tient to his or her speciﬁc medical data. Hashing the social
security number will allow linkage between the information
of the personal medical ﬁle and other national sources of
health information with the aim of completing or validating
the personal medical record or performing epidemiological
research.
Addingpersonalpatientcharacteristicssuchasﬁrstname
and family name, date of birth and/or biometric identiﬁers
(separately hashed, then merged) to the hashed social secu-
rity number could also be proposed in the discussions about
the creation of a European health care identiﬁer. It would
thus contribute to the establishment of European public
health statistics by matching healthcare data of the patients
records with other administrative data. These data linkage
systems would meet the requirements for anonymous data
issued in the European directive on data protection.
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